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THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF NETWORK SECURITY
"Well-coordinated attacks by fewer than 30 computer virtuosos…with a budget of less than $10 million, could bring the United States to its knees."
Center for Strategic and International Studies
The transformation of the US military relies on new technology and lethal targeting to wage rapid, standoff wars with limited casualties. Our doctrine and force structure is built around network operations, advances in information processing, and expectations of network performance. Precision technology has led our politicians to use the information age to guide our strategic policy decisions and minimize exposure of American troops. 1 forces tied down for lengthy periods." 4 It adds that DOD must "move from an approach based on geographically contiguous massing of forces to one based on achieving effects." 5 Networking provides greater situational awareness and is a key enabler of DOD's transformation.
However, DOD networks remain susceptible to attacks caused by human error, insider threats, espionage, and deliberate hacking, potentially creating a tremendous loss of information security. Despite DOD's best efforts, malicious activity continues to climb. Since the US military is so heavily dependent on networked information, our opponents know that both the data and connectivity are a valuable target. The military's network operations and information processing capability may become our center of gravity and the focus of an adversary's efforts. 6 The incentive to penetrate the network, followed by intercepting, contaminating, stealing, or even destroying data will be enormous. 7 This in turn creates problems for weapons systems depending on computers for their performance, or commanders depending on computers to manage information on today's complicated battlefield. 8 Although DOD can defeat hackers most of the time, most of the time is not good enough when the lives of American Soldiers are at stake. There will always be problems with our networks and the associated level of risk could result in the loss of American lives.
This paper will provide a background on the reduction in the military's force structure over the past two decades, followed by a description of the Global Information Grid (GIG) and the advantages of network-centric warfare. It will then focus on human vulnerabilities and their impact on DOD networks. This argument will be substantiated by describing cryptography and the access/security tradeoff, giving the example of the German Enigma cipher, and by providing evidence on personnel reliability, insider threats, hacking, and other forms of non-cooperative access. It will also address how attacks on our critical infrastructure impact the GIG. Finally, this paper will offer recommendations to confront these challenges.
BACKGROUND
With the end of the Cold War, downsizing the US military was inevitable. In the past two decades, the US Army downsized from 18 Active Divisions and 781,000 soldiers to 10 Active
Divisions and 480,000 soldiers. Much of the reason was economic; a smaller force would save money. Another reason, however, was the military's ability to leverage the advantages of the information age, including cyber warfare and satellite links. These advances in IT, combined with surveillance and precision weapons technologies, have permitted a radically new way in which we project power, reducing manpower requirements and reliance on industrial-age military forces. 9 General Schoomaker has now ordered division commanders to explore ways of reorganizing their units into modular, capabilities-based ground forces without adding more troops or equipment. 10 Rather than increasing the Army's end strength, he contends that better information will allow smaller forces to be used more effectively.
IT is now inherent in our doctrine. 11 This publication also recognizes the role of defensive IO in protecting our networks.
Full dimensional protection exists when the joint force can decisively achieve its mission with an acceptable degree of risk in both the physical and information domains.
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THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID AND THE ADVANTAGES OF NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
The demand for a GIG was driven by concerns regarding the integration of automated information systems and the need for information and decision superiority expressed in Joint Vision 2020. The GIG is defined as a "Globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel." 13 In layman's terms, it may be compared to the World Wide Web, as it is used to collect and disseminate information. But the GIG is much more than that. It is comprised of both owned and leased communications, computing systems, and other services required to achieve information superiority. 15 It is argued that the GIG improves the warfighting capability of our forces by significantly reducing uncertainty, allowing collaboration for joint and asynchronous operations, and enabling the commander to achieve information superiority. The GIG has enabled the military to become lighter, faster, and more lethal. 16 During OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), perhaps the first war of the information age, the fog of war was lifted to a much greater extent than in previous campaigns, as megabytes of real-time data and imagery flowed back and forth between the front lines and decision makers in remote command centers. Dramatic advances in technology provided greater fidelity, vastly improving the agility and interoperability of our units. 17 Three brigades of the 3 rd Infantry
Division were able to monitor each other's activity enroute to Baghdad, despite being stretched out over 300 miles. 18 General Franks, the Commander of Central Command during OIF, stated that, "Real-time communications and a common operating picture gave battlefield commanders for the first time information about the precise location and status of their troops." 19 He added that the most important lesson learned from that operation is that, "networked forces rule the battlefield."
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HUMAN VULNERABILITIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOD NETWORKS
Access to the GIG can be a great advantage yet a great risk. In order to achieve a shared sense of battlespace, individuals must have access to information and be able to connect to the network in a variety of ways. So too can the hacker. As a result of global connectivity, "a risk to one is a risk to all." 21 As the world's sole superpower, and with the global war on terrorism in full swing, nontraditional adversaries, such as the hacker, vandal, criminal, or terrorist, are of particular concern in the information domain. Since our enemies cannot compete with us on the conventional battlefield, our computing systems create a number of vulnerable fronts. The penetration of one point of defense may create havoc throughout the network as information security is compromised and data is intercepted, contaminated, or even destroyed leading to significant command and control problems.
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND THE ACCESS/SECURITY TRADEOFF
The strongest tool for controlling most kinds of security threats is cryptography.
Cryptography, or secret writing, uses higher mathematics, computational complexity, and probability and statistics to disguise data so that it cannot be read, modified, or fabricated easily.
Although cryptography is the best defensive measure for network security, even perfect cryptography is not sufficient, as it requires humans to avoid sloppy network behavior and not to get turned or captured. Another important issue is the time it takes to decipher a message so that the scrambling and unscrambling do not deter or delay users from completing their mission. 23 For example, a 25-character message expressed in just uppercase letters has 26 25 possible decipherments. A computer that could perform 10 10 operations per second would require 10 11 years to decipher the message. 24 Without the proper code, it would take an unauthorized user several lifetimes to decipher a message, by which time the content would no longer be useful.
Theoretically, hackers can be beaten with the right cryptography, but hackers can penetrate our networks because of the dilemma between easy access and robust security, otherwise known as the access/security tradeoff. 25 In bulk encryption, each layer of security is not only expensive, but introduces a latency which decreases operational responsiveness. 26 It may take a firewall only milliseconds to decrypt a packet and analyze its content, causing little to no operational impact. However, when the firewall filters or blocks the port upon which the message has been sent, latency could be indefinite. 27 This could lead to significant consequences for military forces relying on networks and data to conduct operations. Thus, the extent of computer security ends up being a tradeoff between putting the computer to use and restricting misuse. 28 THE ENIGMA CIPHER An example of a captured cryptography device we have observed in history is the Enigma cipher machine. The Enigma was a mechanical cryptographic tool used by the Germans in
World War II to scramble messages. It was based on revolving rotors that were wired together on a typewriter keyboard. There were so many ways to encrypt messages with the Enigma, that it would take 1,000 analysts, trying four different ways per minute, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 1.8 billion years to test them all. The technology appeared to offer perfect information security, yet broke because of human user fallibility which enabled the Allies to crack the codes. 29 In 1938, a Polish mechanic was employed in a factory in Eastern Germany, which was making what he judged to be secret signaling machines. After being sent back to Poland, the mechanic got in touch with a British agent in Warsaw, and was soon smuggled to Paris, where he was able to make a wooden mock-up of the machine. The British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) quickly realized it would be essential to get a hold of an actual machine if they were to stand any chance of trying to break its code. With the help of the Polish Secret Service, the British successfully smuggled an Enigma back to England. Later in the war, other Enigmas were obtained from a shot down German aircraft and from a German Tank Signals unit. In May 1941, the Navy captured a German U boat, complete with an Enigma and chart of operating keys. 30 The SIS was located at Bletchley Park, fifty miles north of London. At Bletchley, along with the Government Code and Cypher School, the SIS set out to break the Enigma code. By using captured Enigmas, making use of likely chatter about daily events, and guessing that the Germans would be discussing certain places or issues, the British found sections of scrambled text that could be related to cleartext. They also concentrated on Luftwaffe messages.
Luftwaffe signalmen often used girlfriends' names for key settings, or would begin a second message with the same key setting as the previous message. This knowledge helped the Allies break the Enigma code and determine the Luftwaffe's plans during the Battle of Britain. 31 Intelligence gathered from Enigma significantly contributed to the Allies' victory in World War II. incomplete or missing, configuration management programs which protect the system while it is being designed and maintained 34 are not in place, and physical protection of the SIPRNet is marginal. Web cameras were found in secure areas capable of observing a terminal on a classified network, and foreign nationals were found in areas where the SIPRNet (a US-only network) was present. Lack of due diligence also leads to fielding new systems without consideration of security implications. For example, at least one command introduced Voice over Internet Protocol into the network environment before it was patched for virus protection. 35 Although most DOD employees want to do a good job, 64% of the 249 unauthorized DOD intrusions reported in the first quarter of FY04 resulted from poor security practices. 36 Even though the means are available to plug holes in network security, too few individuals and organizations take advantage of them.
PERSONNEL RELIABILITY AND THE INSIDER THREAT
As we have become increasingly dependent on information systems, the overwhelming focus of attention on the vulnerability of the Nation's networks has been devoted to computer crime and security attacks from external sources, exemplified by the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Yet, losses due to insiders greatly outweigh those due to hackers and other external sources. According to the Computer Security Institute's 1998
Computer Crime Survey, the average cost of a hacker penetration was $56,000, while insider attacks cost companies $2.7 million . A study conducted by the United Nations Commission on Crime and Criminal Justice, which surveyed 3,000 Virtual Address Extension sites, found that the greatest security threat came from employees or other insiders with access to computers. Arjen Lenstra
A hacker is defined as, "a person who "hacks" away at a programmable system (i.e., computer system and applications software) until it works. In contemporary lingo, a person who breaks into computer systems, usually over the Internet."(sic) 41 A hacker can initiate an attack using commercial off-the-shelf products, or even hacker tools from the Internet. He can directly attack DOD unclassified systems or strike indirectly by conducting a strategic attack on power grids or other public utilities. 42 Another threat to the network is the distributed denial of service attack, in which a web server is bombarded with huge amounts of data from many different machines with the intention of bringing the server down. Malicious code, in the form of a Trojan horse (a program that overtly does one thing yet covertly does another), a virus (a Trojan horse that spreads an infection from one computer to another), or a worm (a program that spreads copies of itself as a stand-alone program through a network), 43 can destroy or impede systems configurations or routines. DOD CERT reports that the number of critical is increasing, the impact of each critical is increasing, 46 and the speed of propagation of malicious code is increasing, 47 raising the vulnerability of DOD networks. Figure 2 shows the overall number of detected events on the NIPRNet. In the past ten years, there has been a constant growth in events reported by DOD CERT. These include root and user level compromises, denial of service attacks, and compromises resulting from poor security practices. Although this increase can be attributed in part to better sensors and reporting procedures, it may also reflect a significant increase in malicious activity. Given the critical role played by the GIG in today's warfighting environment, reliable protection of data and the defense of our networks are essential. DOD is in the process of implementing several IA GIG initiatives to counter the threats and vulnerabilities to our networks. Many of these changes are long overdue and the possible IA implications associated with these emerging security technologies are significant. An enormous effort remains to be done at the organizational and individual level.
FIGURE 2 -DETECTED EVENTS ON THE NIPRNET
HEIGHTENED SECURITY AWARENESS AND INSIDER PROTECTION
High-tech network equipment requires high quality training for users who must apply the concepts of IA to protect DOD networks and stay ahead of our adversaries. 60 Network security professionals must be certified on security standards and procedures. Information must be recompartmentalized so that access control of the private differs from the general. Another solution is to have fewer access points and restrictions for certain individuals, or have access based on rank, position, or nationality. 61 Although all of these measures are being done now and the guidance is there, people still make mistakes. 62 FSO continues to find differing levels of completeness in organizations' training and certification requirements, and annual refresher training is rare. 63 The first line of defense for network users is implementation of access control measures such as secure passwords. Another access control measure is the Fortezza card, a common access card which secures sensitive but unclassified data for transmission over unsecured networks. Passwords should be at least 8 characters long, alphanumeric, and changed regularly to prevent them from being machine-guessed. DOD has an 8 character password standard, although FSO has found organizations in violation of DOD's policy. 64 Use of software products that check passwords for compliance is growing but is not universal. 65 Nor is the use of Fortezza cards.
The installation of a firewall will allow only selected gateways to have access to the outside world. Other methods for improving computer network defense include ports and protocols configuration control to block selected ports, anti-virus software, and intrusion detection systems to cope with malicious inputs. 66 DOD has implemented these measures, although the use of additional firewalls beyond the enclave perimeter and the use of personal firewalls on traveling laptops are rare. 67 Network security is not just an individual responsibility. Military leaders and managers in both government and the private sector must ensure users complete IA training before being given access to a system, and then receive annual refresher training to keep pace with technology upgrades and the discovery of new vulnerabilities. Leaders must implement and enforce consistent policies and procedures in computer security with significant consequences for offenders. Commanders must be held responsible for a lack of security in their organization.
Although most people in the military, the government, and corporate America work with information systems, computer security is still practiced half-heartedly. 68 Additionally, commanders must make an operational risk assessment, striking a balance between all net centric (100% accessibility to our networks) and no net centric (0% accessibility). Reducing the connectivity of the network to reduce vulnerabilities also decreases the power of the network. On the other hand, increasing network security will restrict access and also increase response time, arguably decreasing operational capability. If the commander gives up connectivity to increase security, he is essentially taking steps backwards regarding network-centric warfare. For example, installing a firewall to increase security reduces connectivity because less packets will be allowed to pass through. Password protection and
Fortezza cards also reduce connectivity because users will forget their passwords or lose their Fortezza cards. Ultimately, we decide how many voluntary reductions in connectivity we want in order to increase security. This is the access/security tradeoff.
Many of the same measures needed to heighten security awareness for users should be used to protect DOD networks from insiders. In addition to using access control measures such as secure passwords and Fortezza Cards, another helpful but inevitably partial improvement might be for commanders to ensure only selected people have access. For example, more and more individuals are using the SIPRNet, increasing the probability that someone will be negligent or commit espionage. Arguably, such an individual with access to the SIPRNet could cause significant damage to US military operations possibly resulting in the loss of American lives. As the SIPRNet grows, perimeter security must be built internally within its enclaves to compartmentalize information and access. Physical measures, such as access badges and secure doors should also be used as aggressively as possible to limit access.
FSO has also found that configuration management programs do not exist in most organizations. 69 Software initiatives will potentially help with configuration management, thereby improving DOD's IA posture. 70 MIT responded to insider threats by introducing Kerberos, a network authentication protocol that protects passwords and other sensitive information through the use of cryptography. Kerberos uses Data Encryption Standard (DES) to encrypt, and relies on a central authentication server for security. 71 Interviews with experts indicate that Kerberos is a tremendous security tool with an excellent reputation.
Human vulnerabilities cannot be solved with technological solutions alone. Without examining the insider problem and developing new methods of insider risk management, our critical information systems will remain vulnerable to espionage or sabotage by insiders.
Leaders must conduct initial pre-employment screening of employees, to include collecting trait information and conducting a criminal records check. They must establish rules of conduct to guide employees on right and wrong behavior and give supervisors the recourse to punish rule violations. Leaders must ensure that systems administrators revoke access privileges of selected employees prior to lay-off announcements. Ultimately, the highest mitigating factor that reduces the likelihood of an insider attack is intervention by supervisors, co-workers, family or friends. Intervention might lead to counseling or even medical assistance, and may prevent network disasters from occurring. 72 But presumably, all these measures were in use for the espionage cases cited earlier, yet they failed.
TRANSFORMATIONAL GIG INITIATIVES AND DOCTRINAL CHANGES
Numerous transformational GIG initiatives are underway to avert network vulnerabilities and make it easier for users to do the right thing. These include Internet Protocol Version 6, a network layer protocol which will improve end-to-end security and quality of service. These are all useful and important steps. At the margin, they will improve security. But nothing can repeal human nature. The most technically secure network in the world can still be undone by an unreliable insider, and we have never been able to guarantee 100% personnel reliability. There will always be the occasional spy; some operators will always be careless or tired or overworked leading to compromises in DOD networks.
CONCLUSION
Growing confidence in advancing technology has made both politicians and the public alike believe that extreme technological superiority is the answer to the problems of war, and that our downsized military can accomplish any mission with high-tech weaponry and networkcentric warfare. However, evidence shows that the GIG is fragile. Threats to DOD networks are increasing with the number of attacks and the speed of propagation of malicious code. Although measures such as DOD's transformational GIG initiatives are being implemented to mitigate threats to DOD networks, despite our best efforts, the risks will never be completely eliminated. Human vulnerabilities in the information domain are an unsolvable Achilles' heel. Our senior leaders must understand that DOD networks will never be 100%
secure. Perhaps we should reconsider transformation initiatives relating to force structure in light of a more systematic analysis of all the threats to our information systems, to include the human threat. There are only so many approaches to network security. 
